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Abstract—Three relay selection techniques, aiming at
achieving secure non-orthogonal multiple access in cooperative
energy-harvesting (EH) communications, are proposed and
compared. In the cooperative relaying system, the source
node communicates with multiple users through amplify-and-
forward EH relays in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
The relay selection is a two-stage strategy, where the first stage
aims at achieving the users’ target data rate, and the second
aims at optimizing the secrecy outage probability. New explicit
analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability are
derived for three operating scenarios: i) when the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is unknown, and
a two-stage conventional relay selection scheme is considered,
ii) when CSI of the eavesdropper is known, and a two-
stage optimal relay selection scheme is used, and iii) when
multiple relays participate in forwarding the signal to the end
users. Monte-Carlo simulations are provided to confirm the
derivations, and the effects of the main system parameters on
its secrecy are investigated. In particular, it is shown that the
optimal relay selection scheme outperforms the conventional
and the multiple-relays schemes in terms of secrecy outage
probability, and that this superiority becomes more obvious
when the number of the relays increases.
Index Terms—NOMA, cooperative communications, energy
harvesting, secrecy outage probability, physical-layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is a promising
technology to enhance the efficiency of wireless commu-
nication systems [1]. The main idea of NOMA is to serve
multiple users with different power levels. More specifically,
the source superimposes the signals of the users in the
same frequency, time and code domains, but with different
power levels. In this way, NOMA opportunistically explores
the multi-user diversity, e.g., users with poor channel con-
ditions are served with higher transmission power levels.
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These users can detect their signals by treating the other
users’ signals as noise. On the other hand, the users with
strong channel conditions can apply successive interference
cancellation (SIC) technique, in which they detect their
own signals by removing the weaker users’ signals [1].1
The impact of NOMA technique on the performance of
communication systems has been investigated in several
works. For instance, [2] demonstrated that NOMA can
achieve better sum-rate and outage performance than the
traditional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) when the
power coefficients and users’ rates are carefully chosen.
A power allocation strategy to maximize the sum-rate in
NOMA systems with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints
was investigated in [3]. The impact of the availability of
the channel state information (CSI) at the source on the
performance of NOMA systems was also studied in [4].
In addition, different forms of cooperative NOMA systems
have been studied in the literature. In [5], it was shown
that NOMA in coordinated direct and relayed transmission
can enhance the system performance compared to NOMA
in non-coordinated transmission. The achievable average
rate of cooperative NOMA systems is analyzed in [6]
for independent Rayleigh fading channels. In the same
context, the outage performance of cooperative NOMA
networks is evaluated in [7], where a simultaneous wire-
less information and power transfer (SWIPT) technique is
adopted at the near users to forward the far user’s signals.
Further work in [8] considered NOMA in multi-antenna
relaying systems, where the relay’s antenna that optimizes
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is selected
to forward the signal; the results in this work demonstrate
the superiority of NOMA over OMA. In [9], the authors
consider a cooperative NOMA system, in which the source
communicates with the users through an energy harvesting
(EH) relay node, and the impact of power allocation on the
considered SWIPT system is investigated. In this direction,
a cooperative SWIPT-NOMA protocol where users near
the source work as EH relays to help the farther users is
proposed in [10].
Moreover, due to the vulnerability of wireless channels,
1Hereafter, a user with stronger channel condition is referred to as
stronger user. Also, a user with poorer channel condition is referred to
as weaker user.
2attention to the issue of security in wireless communica-
tion systems has increased rapidly. Physical-layer security,
which is based on the physical characteristics of the chan-
nels, has been extensively considered to enhance the secu-
rity performance of wireless communication networks. This
concept was introduced in [11], which shows that a secure
communication can be achieved if the eavesdropper/wire-
tap channel is noisier than a legitimate destination/main
channel. Very recently, physical-layer security has been
studied to perform secure transmission in NOMA systems.
In this trend, physical-layer security in NOMA systems was
studied in [12], with the aim to maximize the NOMA se-
crecy rate subject to QoS requirements. In [13], the security
of NOMA in large-scale networks was considered, and new
analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability
were derived. The security in a downlink NOMA trans-
mission system, in which the users are grouped in clusters
was studied in [14]. The secrecy rate optimization problem
for a downlink NOMA system subject to SIC constraints
has been studied in [15]. Application of NOMA to a multi-
user system with both multi- and uni-cast messages was
investigated in [16]. Since the uni-cast message can be
received by all users, secure NOMA transmission to prevent
multi-cast destinations from decoding the uni-cast signal
has also been considered in [16]. Also, an optimal NOMA
design subject to QoS and secrecy outage constraints was
considered in [17]. In this direction, the secrecy outage
probability of a NOMA system with different transmit
antenna selection schemes was studied in [18].
In this paper, different relay selection schemes are inves-
tigated to enhance the secrecy performance of cooperative
SWIPT-NOMA against any passive eavesdropping attack.
In the considered system, the source and the users have
fixed power supplies. The relays, on the other hand, are
EH nodes that harvest energy from the received source
signal and then amplify-and-forward (AF) this signal to the
users. Three relay selection schemes are considered in this
work. The first is based on scenarios where the CSI of the
eavesdropper channel is unknown at the legitimate nodes,
in which case we study conventional relay selection. The
second relay selection scheme is based on full knowledge
of the main and the eavesdropper’s CSI. Here, an optimal
relay selection scheme is proposed. Thirdly, we consider the
case when multiple relays are used to amplify-and-forward
the source signal to the users.2
Therefore, the major contributions of this work are
twofold. Firstly, novel relay selection schemes are pro-
posed to enhance the secrecy performance of cooperative
SWIPT-NOMA systems for the three aforementioned cases.
Secondly, although the performance analysis of such co-
2It is important to mention that these three cases/schemes are inves-
tigated in order to explain the effect of the channel knowledge on the
system performance, and not simply for comparison purpose. A two-stage
selection strategy is considered in each relay selection scheme. The goal
of the first stage is to realize the users’ target data rate, and the second
stage aims at optimizing the secrecy outage probability at the strongest
user.
operative systems is hard and challenging, in this paper,
new explicit analytical expressions for the secrecy outage
probability are derived for the three relay selection schemes.
Furthermore, the impact of the main system parameters on
the secrecy performance of the proposed relay selection
schemes are examined. Results show that optimal relay
selection outperforms the conventional and the multiple-
relay schemes. It is also shown that increasing the SNR
and the number of relaying nodes enhances the secrecy
performance, whereas an increase of the total number of
users and their target data rates results in a deterioration of
the system security in terms of secrecy outage probability.
Next, Section II describes the system under consideration.
Sections III and IV derive the analytical expressions for the
secrecy outage probability when CSI of the eavesdropper is
unknown or fully known, respectively. Section V, derives
the secrecy outage probability when multiple relays are used
to forward the source message. Numerical and simulation
results are presented and discussed in Section VI. Finally,
the main conclusions of this work are stated in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a downlink relaying system consisting of a
source transmitter, N EH-AF relays and M legitimate users,
operating in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Each
node in the system is equipped with a single antenna
and operates in half-duplex mode. The source and users’
equipments have fixed power supplies, while the relays
are EH nodes solely relying on their harvested energy.
Each relay implements a power-splitting EH protocol, as
described in [19], to harvest energy and process information
from the received observations. The channel coefficient
between the source and a relay n is denoted by hsrn , and
the channel coefficients between a relay n and user i and
the eavesdropper are denoted hrnui and hrne, respectively.
The channels are asumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading channels.3 The distances
between the nodes are denoted by dsrn (source to relay n),
drnui (relay n to user i), and drne (relay n to eavesdropper).
Due to deep shadowing, the communication in the system is
achieved through the EH-relay node(s), and the direct links
(source to legitimate users, and source to eavesdropper) are
assumed not available, e.g., the users and the eavesdropper
are not in the coverage area of the source. This assumption
has been widely adopted in the literature pertaining to
cooperative systems [22]–[24].
Therefore, the source and the users communicate with
each other over two phases. During Phase-I, following the
principle of NOMA, the source node transmits a superim-
posed signal to the users, which is received firstly by all the
relays. Part of the received signal energy will be harvested
by the relays to charge their batteries using the power
splitting technique, while the other part of the received
3The Rayleigh fading model has been widely considered in the literature
of EH systems, see e.g. [1], [7], [9], [10], [19]–[22].
3signal energy will be allocated for information processing.
The second phase (Phase-II), consists in the forwarding of
signals through AF relaying.
A. First Transmission Phase
In Phase-I, the source transmits the signal using super-
position coding, s =
M∑
i=1
√
αiPsxi, where Ps is the source
power, xi is the signal for user i, and αi is the power
allocation coefficient for user i, with
M∑
i=1
αi = 1. The users
are ordered based on their average channel gains, which in
the considered scenario is the same as path loss. The path
loss does not vary fast compared to the small-scale fading.
Thus, the distance-based users’ ranking can simplify the
design of power allocation and rate adaptation for NOMA.
The application of distance-based users’ ranking in NOMA
systems has been thoroughly discussed in [25]–[28]. With
such ordering, user M is the closest user to the source, and
is thus the strongest one. The observation at the nth relay
is hence given by
yrn = hsrn
M∑
i=1
√
αiPs
dmsrn
xi + nrn , (1)
where m is the path-loss exponent, and nrn is the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at relay n with variance
σ2rn , i.e., nrn ∼ CN
(
0, σ2rn
)
. We define βrn as the fraction
of the received power allocated for the EH, and (1− βrn)
as the part allocated for the information processing. Conse-
quently, the received signal at the relay’s EH receiver is
y
EH
rn
= hsrn
M∑
i=1
√
βrnαiPs
dmsrn
xi + nrn . (2)
Neglecting the noise power, the harvested energy at relay
n can be estimated as Ern = TηrnβrnPs|hsrn |
2
2dmsrn
, where ηrn is
the EH efficiency and T is the time required to transmit the
signal from the source to the users. The received signal at
the information receiver (IR) of relay n is
y
IR
rn
= hsrn
M∑
i=1
√
(1− βrn)αiPs
dmsrn
xi + nrn . (3)
B. Second Transmission Phase
In Phase-II, the relay transmits a scaled version of the
received signal, xrn = Grn yIRrn , where Grn is the relay gain.
Given that
M∑
i=1
αi = 1, the relay gain is defined by
Grn =
√√√√ Prn
(1−βrn)Ps
dmsrn
|hsrn |2 + σ2rn
. (4)
where Prn is the harvested power at relay n which is Prn =
ηrnβrnPs|hsrn |
2
dmsrn
. Now substituting Prn in (4) we get
Grn =
√√√√ ηrnβrnPs |hsrn |2
(1− βrn)Ps |hsrn |2 + dmsrnσ2rn
. (5)
Therefore, the received signals at user ui and at the eaves-
dropper via relay n are given by (6) and (7) respectively,
where nui is the AWGN at user ui with variance σ2ui , i.e.,
nui ∼ CN
(
0, σ2ui
)
, and ne is the AWGN at the eavesdrop-
per with variance σ2e , i.e., ne ∼ CN
(
0, σ2e
)
. Similar to the
strongest user in conventional NOMA systems, user M will
carry out SIC, i.e., user M first detects all the other users’
signals and then subtracts them from its observation before
decoding its own message xM .
C. SINR Derivations
The SINR at user M to detect the kth user message, xk,
where 1 ≤ k < M , via relay n, is given by (8). After
all signals are detected successfully, user M removes these
messages and detects its own message, xM , with SINR
given by
γn,M =
(1− βrn)PsG2rnαM |hsrn |2 |hrnuM |2
G2rn |hrnuM |2 dmsrnσ2rn + dmsrndmrnuiσ2uM
. (9)
Similar to the weak users in conventional NOMA systems,
user k detects its message, xk, by treating the other stronger
users’ messages,
M∑
i=k+1
xi, as noise. Therefore, the SINR
for detecting the messages xj at user k, where j ∈ [1 : k],
using relay n, is given by (10).
The worst-case scenario is taken into account, in which
the eavesdropper always performs SIC successfully and
targets the strong user, i.e., user M , [12]. Therefore, the
SINR at the eavesdropper to detect xM through relay n is
given by
γn,e =
(1− βrn)PsG2rnαM |hsrn |2 |hrne|2
G2rn |hrne|2 dmsrnσ2rn + dmsrndmrneσ2e
. (11)
Similarly, the SINR at the eavesdropper to detect the kth
user’s signal is given by (12).
In the next three sections, three scenarios are considered
to optimize the secrecy performance of user M , when
only one relay is selected to forward the signal and the
eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown or fully known, or when
multiple relays are chosen to forward the signal.
III. CONVENTIONAL RELAY SELECTION
In this scenario, the CSI pertaining to the eavesdropper
is assumed to be unknown at the legitimate nodes. Conven-
tional relay selection strategy is proposed in this scenario.
The selected relay, active in the second transmission phase,
is the one that can provide the maximum SINR at the
intended user, uM , while at the same time providing the
required data rates to the other users. Hence, the aim of
this scheme is to (i) maximize the SINR at the intended
4yn,ui = Grn
hrnui√
dmrnui
(
hsrn
M∑
k=1
√
(1− βrn)αkPs
dmsrn
xk + nrn
)
+ nui ,
=
√
(1− βrn)Ps
dmsrnd
m
rnui
Grnhrnuihsrn
(
M∑
k=1
√
αkxk
)
+
√
1
dmrnui
Grnhrnuinrn + nui , (6)
yn,e =
√
(1− βrn)Ps
dmsrnd
m
rne
Grnhrnehsrn
(
M∑
k=1
√
αkxk
)
+
√
1
dmrne
Grnhrnenrn + ne, (7)
γn,xk−→M =
(1− βrn)PsG2rnαk |hsrn |2 |hrnuM |2
(1− βrn)PsG2rn |hsrn |2 |hrnuM |2
M∑
i=k+1
αi +G2rn |hrnuM |2 dmsrnσ2rn + dmsrndmrnuMσ2uM
. (8)
γn,xj−→k =
(1− βrn)PsG2rnαj |hsrn |2 |hrnuk |2
(1− βrn)PsG2rn |hsrn |2 |hrnuk |2
M∑
i=j+1
αi +G2rn |hrnuk |2 dmsrnσ2rn + dmsrndmrnukσ2uk
. (10)
γn,xk−→e =
(1− βrn)PsG2rnαk |hsrn |2 |hrne|2
(1− βrn)PsG2rn |hsrn |2 |hrne|2
M∑
i=k+1
αi +G2rn |hrne|2 dmsrnσ2rn + dmsrndmrneσ2e
. (12)
user, and (ii) serve the other users with their required data
rates.
Firstly, we select a sub-set of the EH-relays (Nr) that
satisfy the following conditions:
Nr =
{
n : 1 ≤ n ≤ N, 1
2
log (1 + γn,M ) > R¯M ,
1
2
log (1 + γn,k) > R¯k,
1
2
log (1 + γn,xk−→j) > R¯k
}
,
(13)
where k ∈ {1, 2, ..,M − 1}, j ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, ...,M} ,
log (.) represents logarithm of base-2, R¯M and R¯k are the
target data rates at user M and user k, respectively, and the
size of Nr is denoted by |Nr|.
From this sub-set Nr, the best relay (n∗) is selected as the
one that maximizes the SINR at user M , hence, γn∗,M =
max {γn,M , n ∈ Nr} .
A. Performance Analysis
Here, we will characterize the secrecy outage probability
for the conventional relay selection scheme. The secrecy
outage probability is the probability that the secrecy rate
is less than a target secrecy rate R0 [29]. Therefore, the
secrecy outage probability in this scheme can be calculated
by
Psop = Pr (|Nr| = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O1
∪Pr

1 + maxn∈Nr {γn,M}
1 + γn,e
< ζ, Nr > 0


︸ ︷︷ ︸
O2
,
(14)
where O1 is the probability that all the relays cannot provide
the required data rates to the users, i.e., Nr = ∅, and O2 is
the probability that the secrecy rate at user M is less than
the threshold value Ro, in which ζ = 22Ro .
Lemma 1. From (13), O1 can be found as
O1 =
N∏
n=1
{
1− Pr (Rn,M > R¯M) M−1∏
k=1
[
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
M∏
j=k+1
Pr
(
Rn,k→j > R¯k
)

 , (15)
where
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
=
∞ˆ
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
e
−
(
z+
ζka4z+a5ζk
(z2(a1−a2ζk)−a3zζk)
)
dz,
(16)
5O2 =
N∑
Q=1
{
Q∑
l=1
Pr (n∗ = l)Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γl,eζ − 1 | |Nr| = Q, n∗ = l
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
}
Pr (|Nr| = Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
. (22)
which can be expressed at high SNRs as [19]
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
) ≈ w1J1 [w1] e− a3ζka1−a2ζk , (17)
where ζk = 22R¯k and J1 [.] is the first-order modified Bessel
function of the second kind [30], and
Pr
(
Rn,k→j > R¯k
)
=
∞ˆ
b3ζk
b1−b2ζk
e
−
(
z+
ζkb4z+b5ζk
(z2(b1−b2ζk)−b3zζk)
)
dz.
(18)
At high SNRs, (18) can be written as
Pr
(
Rn,k→j > R¯k
) ≈ w2J1 [w2] e− b3ζkb1−b2ζk . (19)
Also, we have
Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
)
=
∞ˆ
c2ζM
c1
e
−
(
z+
ζMc3z+c4ζM
z2c1−c2zζM
)
dz, (20)
which, at high SNRs, can be expressed by
Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
) ≈ w3J1 [w3] e− c2ζMc1 . (21)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. O2 in (14) can be calculated using the law of
total probability as in (22), where
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γζ − 1
)
=
∞ˆ
0
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l

1−
∞ˆ
c2(ζ+γζ−1)
c1
e
−
(
z+
(ζ+γζ−1)c3z+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(z2c1−c2z(ζ+γζ−1))
)
dz


×


ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
{
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
}
e−θdθ
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2
{
1− e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θ+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2c1−c2θ(ζ+γζ−1))
)}
×
{
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
}
e−θdθ
}
dγ.
(23)
At high SNRs, we have
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γζ − 1
)
=
n∑
i=1
Hieγi
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l
{
1− w4J1 [w4] e−
c2(ζ+γiζ−1)
c1
}
×

e
−

 γie3 ǫ2+ǫ12 +e4γi(
( ǫ2+ǫ12 )
2
e1−e2
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
γi
)


×
(
γie3
ǫ2+ǫ1
2 + e4γi
)
(ǫ2 − ǫ1) e1
(
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e−
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
γi
((
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e1 − e2 ǫ2+ǫ12 γi
)2
+
n∑
j=1
Hj

1− e−
(
(ζ+γiζ−1)c3θj+c4(ζ+γiζ−1)
(θ2j c1−c2θj(ζ+γiζ−1))
)
×
 1γi e
−
(
γie3θj+e4γi
(θ2j e1−e2θjγi)
)
(γie3θj + e4γi) θ
2
je1(
θ2je1 − e2θjγi
)2



 ,
(24)
where γi and Hi are the ith abscissa and weight of the nth
order Laguerre polynomial, respectively, [30, eq. (25.4.45)].
The probability that relay l is selected, Pr (n∗ = l) = pl, is
given by
pl =
n∑
i=1
Hiexi


∞ˆ
c2x
c1
(c3z + c4) z
2c1
(z2c1 − c2zx)2
e
−
(
z+
x c3z+c4x
z2c1−c2zx
)


×
Q∏
n=1
l 6=n

1−
∞ˆ
c2x
c1
e
−
(
z+
x c3z+c4x
z2c1−c2zx
)
dz

 , (25)
which, at high SNRs, is expressed as
pl =
n∑
i=1
Hiexi×
4γMc3J0
[√
4γMc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
2xc1
+
c2xw5J1
[√
4γMc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
c1


×
Q∏
n=1
l 6=n
(
1−
√
4xc3
c1
J1
[√
4xc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
)
, (26)
6where xi and Hi are the ith abscissa and weight of the nth
order Laguerre polynomial, respectively, [30, eq. (25.4.45)].
In addition, S2 in (22) can be calculated using
Pr (|Nr| = Q) =
(
N
Q
)
P
N−Q
1 (1− P1)Q , (27)
where P1 = Pr (|Nr| = 0).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. The secrecy outage probability achieved by
the two-stage conventional relay selection strategy can be
calculated as
Psop = O1 ∪O2, (28)
where O1 and O2 are derived in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
respectively.
IV. OPTIMAL RELAY SELECTION
In certain cases, where a user can play dual role as a le-
gitimate receiver for some messages and as an eavesdropper
for others, e.g., in a time-division multiple access (TDMA)
environment, the legitimate nodes can know the eavesdrop-
per’s CSI [31], [32]. In other words, the eavesdropper is
a user of the system and has an ongoing communication
with the source, i.e., the eavesdropper is not a hidden node
and is not necessarily a malicious user. Instead, it is an
active node participating in the communication exchange
with the source. When CSI of both the wiretap and the main
links is known, the relay node that maximizes the secrecy
rate is considered to be the optimal relay. Therefore, in this
scenario, we consider an optimal relay selection scheme, in
which the best selected relay is the one that can provide
the maximum secrecy rate at user M and, at the same time,
can provide the required data rates to the other users. In
this scheme, we select a sub-set, Nr, of the EH-relays that
satisfy the users data rates, as explained in the previous
section in (13). Then, from this sub-set, Nr, the best relay
n∗ that optimizes the secrecy rate at user M is selected.
Hence,
Cn
∗
s,M = max
{
Cns,M , n ∈ Nr
}
, (29)
where Cns,M is the secrecy rate of user M via relay n.
Theorem 4. The secrecy outage probability achieved by the
two-stage optimal relay selection strategy can be calculated
as
Psop = O1∪
N∑
Q=1
{
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
Cns,M
}
< Ro | |Nr| = Q
)
Pr (|Nr| = Q)}
(30)
where O1 is given in Lemma 1, Pr (|Nr| = Q) is expressed
in (27), and
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
Cns,M
}
< Ro | |Nr| = Q
)
=
∞ˆ
0
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l

1−
∞ˆ
c2(ζ+γζ−1)
c1
e
−
(
z+
(ζ+γζ−1)c3z+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(z2c1−c2z(ζ+γζ−1))
)
dz


×


ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
{
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
}
e−θdθ
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2
{
1− e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θ+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2c1−c2θ(ζ+γζ−1))
)}
×
{
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
}
e−θdθ
}
dγ.
(31)
At high SNRs, the expression above can be approximated
as follows:
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
Cns,M
}
< Ro ||Nr| = Q
)
=
Q∏
n=1
n∑
i=1
Hieγi



e−

 γe3 ǫ2+ǫ12 +e4γ(
( ǫ2+ǫ12 )
2
e1−e2
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
γ
)


×
(
γe3
ǫ2+ǫ1
2 + e4γ
)
(ǫ2 − ǫ1)
(
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e1
γ
((
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e1 − e2 ǫ2+ǫ12 γ
)2


+
n∑
j=1
Hj

1− e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θj+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2j c1−c2θj(ζ+γζ−1))
)

×

 1γi e
−
(
γie3θj+e4γi
(θ2j e1−e2θjγi)
)
(γie3θj + e4γi) θ
2
je1(
θ2je1 − e2θjγi
)2



 .
(32)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
V. COMMUNICATION WITH MULTIPLE RELAYS
In this scenario, in order to avoid the imperfect SIC at
the users due to the effect of simultaneous multiple relays
transmissions, an orthogonal transmission technique, such
as TDMA, is employed in the second phase. Specifically,
each relay transmits its message in a specific time slot in
the second phase. In addition, the users apply maximum
ratio combining (MRC) technique to maximize their total
SINR. Consequently, taking into account that the CSI of
7the eavesdropper is unknown and that l relays are used to
forward the signal to the users, the rates at user M and at
the eavesdropper can be written as
RM = a log
(
1+
l∑
n=1
γn,M
)
, Re = a log
(
1+
l∑
n=1
γn,e
)
,
(33)
where a = 1
l + 1
. We can now define a set Φ which
contains all the possible subsets of the available relay
combinations that can provide the target data rates at the
users, Φ = [Φ1, .,Φn, ....,ΦC ], where Φn is the nth subset
that contains a possible combination of the available relays,
with the number of relays being |Φn| = ln and the number
of subsets being |Φ| = C.
A. Performance Analysis
Here, we will analyze the secrecy outage probability
achieved by using multiple relays to amplify-and-forward
the source signal to the users. The secrecy outage probabil-
ity in this scheme can be calculated as
Psop = Pr (|Φ| = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ1
∪ Pr (Cs,M < Ro, |Φ| 6= 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ2
, (34)
where Λ1 is the probability that all the relay sub-sets cannot
provide the required data rates to the users, i.e., when Φ =
∅, and Λ2 is the probability that the secrecy rate at user M
is less than the threshold value.
Lemma 5. From (34), the probability Λ1 can be calculated
by
Λ1 =
C∏
n=1
{
1− Pr (RΦn,M > R¯M) M−1∏
k=1
Pr
(
RΦn,k > R¯k
) M∏
j=k+1
Pr
(
RΦn,k→j > R¯k
)

 , (35)
where RΦn,M is the rate at user M using the relays in
subset Φn, and
Pr
(
RΦn,M > R¯M
)
= 1− 2
−Qe
A
2
γM
Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
)
N+q∑
n=0
(−1)n
βn
R


MϕM
(
A+ 2πjn
2γM
)
A+ 2πjn
2γM

+ E(A,N,Q),
(36)
where j2 = −1, R {.} denotes the real part; A, N and Q
are positive integers used to control accuracy and satisfy
the condition that a remainder error term E(A,N,Q) is
negligible compared with the first term,
|E(A,N,Q)| = e
−A
1− e−A +
∣∣∣∣∣2
−Qe
A
2
γM
Q∑
q=0
(−1)N+1+q
(
Q
q
)
R


Mϕ
(
A+ 2πj (N + q + 1)
2γM
)
A+ 2πj (N + q + 1)
2γM


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (37)
βn =
{
2 n = 0
1 n = 1, 2, · · · , N + q ,
and
MϕM (s) =
ln∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−sγM
γM
×


∞ˆ
c2γM
c1
e
−
(
xn+
γMc3xn+c4γM
(x2nc1−c2xnγM )
)
(γMc3xn + c4γM )x
2c1
(x2nc1 − c2xnγM )2
dx

 dγM .
(38)
At high SNR, we get
MϕM (s) =
ln∏
n=1
K∑
r=1
Hr
s
×

sw23J0 [w3] e− c2γMrsc1
2γMr
+
sc2γMrw3J1 [w3] e
−
c2γMr
sc1
γMrc1

 ,
(39)
where Hr and γMr are the rth abscissa and weight, respec-
tively, of the rth order Laguerre polynomial. Similarly, the
probabilities Pr
(
RΦn,k > R¯k
)
and Pr
(
RΦn,k→j > R¯k
)
can be calculated using (36) with moment-generating func-
tions (MGFs) given, respectively, by
Mϕk (s) =
ln∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−sγk
γk


∞ˆ
a3γk
a1−a2γk
e
−
(
x+
γka4x+a5γk
(x2(a1−a2γk)−a3xγk)
)
×
(
(γka4x+ a5γk) (2x (a1 − a2γk)− a3γk)
(x2 (a1 − a2γk)− a3xγk)2
− γka4
(x2 (a1 − a2γk)− a3xγk) − 1
)
dx
}
dγk, (40)
which, at high SNR, becomes
Mϕk (s) =
ln∏
n=1
K∑
r=1
Hr
s
×
8
sw21J0 [w1] e− a3γkra1−a2γk
2γkr
+
sa3γkrw1J1 [w1] e
−
a3γkr
a1−a2γk
γkra2

 ,
(41)
and
Mϕj (s) =
ln∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−sγk
γk


∞ˆ
b3γk
b1−b2γk
e
−
(
x+
γkb4x+b5γk
(x2(b1−b2γk)−b3xγk)
)
×
(
(γkb4x+ b5γk) (2x (b1 − b2γk)− b3γk)
(x2 (b1 − b2γk)− b3xγk)2
− γkb4
(x2 (b1 − b2γk)− b3xγk) − 1
)
dx
}
dγk, (42)
which, at high SNR, is given by
Mϕj (s) =
ln∏
n=1
K∑
r=1
Hr
s
×

sw22J0 [w2] e− b3γkrb1−b2γkr
2γkr
+
sb3γkrw2J1 [w2] e
−
b3γkr
b1−b2γkr
γkrb2

 .
(43)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D.
Alternatively, to find simpler expressions for the prob-
abilities in (35), these probabilities can be upper-bounded
using the fact that [21, (40)], Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,M < γM
)
≤
ln∏
n=1
Pr (γn,M < γM ) ,
Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,k < γk
)
≤
ln∏
n=1
Pr (γn,k < γk) , and
Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,k→j < γk
)
≤
ln∏
n=1
Pr (γn,k→j < γk) , where
Pr (γn,M < γM ), Pr (γn,k < γk) and Pr (γn,k→j < γk) are
derived in the previous sections.
Lemma 6. Λ2 in (34) can be derived in this scenario given
that Φ = Φn, as
Λ2 =
C∑
n=1
Pr
(
CΦns,M < Ro
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PΦn
=
C∑
n=1
Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,M < ζ + ζ
ln∑
n=1
γn,e − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PΦn
, (44)
where CΦns,M is the secrecy rate of user M via subset Φn,
and PΦn is the Psop using the subset Φn. Conditioning on
hsr, PΦn is derived as
PΦn =
∞ˆ
0




ǫ2,1ˆ
ǫ1,1
.......
ǫ2,lnˆ
ǫ1,ln
fγe (γ) f|hsr|2 (θ1, ...., θln) dθ1....dθln
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2,1
.......
∞ˆ
ǫ2,ln
F ˆγM (ζ + γζ − 1)×
fγe (γ) f|hsr|2 (θ1, ...., θln) dθ1....dθln
]}
dγ.
(45)
The probability in (45) requires at least ln+1-fold integrals,
which makes it hard if not impossible to find a closed-
form solution. For simplicity and to gain some insights,
we consider the cases where the relays are identical and
located at the same distance from the source, such as when
the relays are located at the boundary of the cell and the
source (base-station) is located at the center of the cell, or
in sensors network when the access point is located at the
center of the network.
Remark 7. If the relays are identical nodes, the expression
of PΦn can be simplified to
PΦn =
∞ˆ
0



 ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
fγe (γ) f|hsr|2 (θ) dθ +
∞ˆ
ǫ2
F ˆγM (ζ + γζ − 1) fγe (γ) f|hsr|2 (θ) dθ

ln

 dγ, (46)
From the derivation in Appendix D, the conditional cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF), F ˆγM (ζ + γζ − 1) can be
written as
F ˆγM (ς) =
2−Qe
A
2
ς
Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
) N+q∑
n=0
(−1)n
βn
×R


Mϕ
(
A+ 2πjn
2ς
)
A+ 2πjn
2ς

+ E(A,N,Q) (47)
where ς = ζ + γζ − 1 and
Mϕ (s) =
ln∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−sς
{
e
−
(
ςc3θ+c4ς
(θ2c1−c2θς)
)
(c3θ + c4) θ
2c1
(θ2c1 − c2θς)2
}
dς
(48)
≈
ln∏
n=1
n∑
i=1
Hieςi(1−s)
{
e
−
(
ςic3θ+c4ςi
(θ2c1−c2θςi)
)
(c3θ + c4) θ
2c1
(θ2c1 − c2θςi)2
}
,
(49)
9The probability density function (PDF) fγe (γ) can be
obtained with the inverse Laplace transform as fγe (γ) =
L
−1 (Mϕ (s)) [33], [34]. Using the formula in [34], the
PDF of the SINR at the eavesdropper can be obtained
according to
fγe (γ) =
2−Qe
A
2
γ
Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
) N+q∑
n=0
(−1)n
βn
×R
(
Mγe
(
A+ 2πjn
2γ
))
+ E(A,N,Q), (50)
where
Mγe (s) =
ln∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−sγe
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(e3θ + e4) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
dγ
≈
ln∏
n=1
n∑
i=1
Hieγi(1−s)e
−
(
γie3θ+e4γi
(θ2e1−e2θγi)
)
(e3θ + e4) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγi)2
.
(51)
It is worth to mention that, the conditional CDF,
FγM (ζ + γζ − 1), and the conditional PDF, fγe (γ),
can be derived as upper-bounds using the same iden-
tity as in [21], Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,M < ζ + ζγ − 1
)
≤
l∏
n=1
Pr (γn,M < ζ + ζγ − 1) and Pr
(
l∑
n=1
γn,e < γ
)
≤
l∏
n=1
Pr (γn,e < γ) .
Theorem 8. The secrecy outage probability achieved by
the two-stage conventional relay selection strategy can be
calculated as
Psop = Λ1 ∪ Λ2, (52)
where Λ1 and Λ2 can be calculated using Lemma 5 and
Lemma 6.
Remark 9. All the probabilities in this work are provided
in closed-form exact expressions, and approximated expres-
sions based on high SNRs.4 Each probability expression
describes part of the total system performance. For instance,
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
gives insight on the performance of user k,
and the term Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
)
gives clear insight on the
performance of user M . In addition, from these expressions
the impact of different system parameters on the overall
system performance can be clearly observed. For instance,
from (17), (19) and (21), it is clear that, when βrn is large
the secrecy outage probability can be enhanced because
the relays can harvest higher power. A larger βrn can also
degrade the secrecy outage probability because it leaves a
smaller power fraction to process the data. Therefore, there
is an optimal value of βrn that results in optimal system
performance. This optimal value can be obtained easily
using the expressions derived in this paper. For instance, the
4The performance analysis of the case when the number of relays goes
to infinity can also give insights about the secrecy outage probability. Due
to the paper length limitation, this case will be investigated in future work.
problem can be formulated as: min
0<βrn<1
Psop. One method
to solve this problem and find the optimal value of βrn
is using line search techniques such as the golden section
method [35].
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, in order to examine the secrecy perfor-
mance of the proposed schemes, some numerical and sim-
ulation results corresponding to the derived expressions are
presented. The analytical results are illustrated by carrying
out Monte-Carlo simulations, which were executed over
105 independent trials. Unless stated otherwise, the noise
power at all nodes are set as σ2 = 0 dBw, the path-loss
exponent m = 2.7, η = 0.8 [35], SNR=Ps
σ2
, the power
allocation coefficients α2i = M−i+1µ , with µ chosen to
satisfy
M∑
i=1
α2i = 1, the number of users M = 3, and
the number of relays |Nr| = 4. For illustration purposes,
we consider a 2D system topology where the source, the
users and the eavesdropper are located at (xds, yds) =
(0, 0), (xdu1 , ydu1) = (0, 2), (xdu2 , ydu2) = (1.5, 0),
(xdM, ydM) = (1, 0), and (xde, yde) = (0, 1), respectively,
and the relays are located at (xdRe1, ydRe1) = (1, 0.5),
(xdRe2, ydRe2) = (1.5, 0.5), (xdRe3, ydRe3) = (1, 1.5) and
(xdRe4, ydRe4) = (1.5, 1.5). Due to the symmetry between
the strongest user and the eavesdropper paths, this topology
can explain the benefit of the relay selection schemes. Such
topology has been considered in [36], [37]. Please note that
the selected topology is used for the sake of presentation and
that the enhancements of the proposed selection schemes
hold for all possible configurations [37]. For clarity, some
results for the case when the users are randomly distributed
inside a circle area with a radius of 10m and the source
node is located at the center of this area are also presented.
A. Effect of Target Secrecy Rate and Number of Relays
To demonstrate the impact of the target secrecy rate
Ro and of the number of relays on the secrecy outage
probability, we plot Fig. 1, which represents Psop versus
Ro for different values of the number of relays in the three
selection schemes. It should be pointed out that in this
figure, Re2 and Re3 are used when two relays are assumed
in the system. In the case of multiple-relays scheme, two
scenarios are considered: when only two relays (one subset)
and when four relays subsets are used. It is evident from
these results that Psop increases as the target secrecy rate
increases, and that increasing the number of the relays
results in a degradation of Psop in the three considered
schemes. In addition, comparing the three schemes for each
value of the number of relays, one can notice that the
optimal relay selection scheme outperforms the other two
schemes.5 This improvement in performance can be clearly
5This is because in the optimal relay selection, the best relay has been
selected based on the knowledge of the CSI of the eavesdropper, which is
not the case in the other two schemes.
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seen when Ro is small and |Nr| = 4, while in the case
of |Nr| = 2 the optimal scheme has the best performance
when Ro is approximately between 0 and 1.2. After that,
the optimal and conventional schemes inclined to achieve
similar secrecy performance. On the other hand, using
multiple relays results in the worst secrecy performance
when C = 1 compared to the optimal and conventional
schemes. This is because, l relays are used to forward
the signal to the users by TDMA. In this case, l + 1
slots are needed to achieve the end-to-end communication,
which is represented by a in (33). In conventional and
optimal relay selection techniques, l = 1. Having said that,
when C = 4 the multiple relay scheme outperforms the
conventional scheme only at low values of the target secrecy
rate 0 < Ro < 0.5. It is also worth noticing that increasing
the number of relay sub-sets |Φ| = C enhances the system
security.
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Figure 1: Secrecy outage probability versus Ro for different values
of |Nr| when SNR = 30 dB.
B. Effect of Target Secrecy Rate and SNR
Fig. 2 depicts some simulated and numerical results of
Psop as a function of the target secrecy rate Ro for different
SNR values when only two relays, Re1 and Re2, are used in
the system. From the results in this figure, we can clearly
observe that increasing the SNR always enhances Psop in
the three schemes. When SNR=10 dB, the conventional
relay selection scheme performs similarly to the optimal
relay selection scheme. On the other hand, when SNR=30
dB and SNR=60 dB, the optimal relay selection scheme
outperforms the conventional scheme. The performance gap
between the three schemes increases as the SNR increases,
where the multiple-relays scheme always has the worst
secrecy performance.
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Figure 2: Secrecy outage probability versus Ro for different values
of SNR when |Nr | = 2, C = 1, and |Φ1| = 2.
C. Effect of Users’ Target Data Rate and Number of Users
In this subsection, we capture the influence of the users’
target data rate, the number of users, and the SNR, on the
system secrecy performance. Fig. 3 presents Psop versus
SNR for different combinations of M and the users’ target
data rates, for the three schemes. In general, it is seen that
increasing the SNR enhances Psop for all the studied config-
urations. In addition, comparing the studied combinations
for each scheme, it can be seen that, for a given SNR
the secrecy performance improves as the number of users
and the target rates decrease. This enhancement becomes
smaller at high SNR. In addition, it is interesting to notice
that increasing the target rates of the users, R¯1 and R¯2
in case M = 3, has almost similar impact on the system
secrecy. In contrast, when M = 2 increasing the target rate
R¯1 of the first user (weakest) impacts essentially the system
security.
To compare the secrecy performance of the three schemes
for these system features, we plot Fig. 3d and Fig. 3e. These
figures illustrate that the gap between the conventional and
optimal schemes is tight at low SNR, and becomes wider
as the SNR goes higher. This can be explained as discussed
for Fig. 1 and Fig. 2; the gain attained by the optimal relay
selection scheme increases as the number of relays and/or
the SNR increase. In addition, the multiple-relays scheme
has the worst secrecy performance for all the combinations
considered in this figure.
D. Randomness of the Users Locations
In this subsection, we present in Fig. 4 some results when
the number of users M = 8, and the users are uniformly
distributed inside a circle area with a radius of 10m and
the source node is located at the center of this area. In
addition, the number of the relays N = 4, which are
located 5m away from the source in different directions,
e.g, (xdRe1, ydRe1) = (5, 5), (xdRe2, ydRe2) = (−5, 5) ,
(xdRe3, ydRe3) = (−5,−5) and(xdRe4, ydRe4) = (5,−5).
It is clear from these results that high transmission power
is needed to achieve secure communication, due to large
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(a) Psop versus SNR of conventional relay selection
scheme.
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(b) Psop versus SNR of optimal relay selection scheme.
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(c) Psop versus SNR of multiple relays scheme.
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(d) Psop versus SNR of the three schemes when M = 3.
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Figure 3: Secrecy outage probability versus SNR of the three schemes for different values of M, R¯1, R¯2, R¯3 when Ro = 0.2.
path-loss. Furthermore, the optimal relay selection scheme
always has the best performance, and multiple relay scheme
has better performance than the conventional scheme only
at low target secrecy rate, as it is noted in Fig. 1.
E. Impact of Eavesdropper Location
Here, we investigate the impact of the eavesdropper’s lo-
cation on the secrecy outage probability. The position of the
eavesdropper is varied on the x-axis from (0, 1) meters to
(4, 1) meters, i.e., the eavesdropper moves horizontally from
the original location (0, 1). Fig. 5 shows the secrecy outage
probability as a function of the eavesdropper location, when
SNR=30 dB and only two relays are used, i.e., Re1 and Re3.
From this figure, we observe that Psop is at its maximum
when the eavesdropper is approximately at (1, 1), i.e., when
it is located between the two relays. Also, Psop decreases
as the eavesdropper moves away. This phenomena can be
justified by the fact that, when the eavesdropper is between
the two relays, the distance between the eavesdropper and
the two relays will be short. Thus, the received information
signal at the eavesdropper will be strong, and as a result the
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Figure 4: Secrecy outage probability versus Ro for different values
of SNR when |Nr | = 4, C = 4, |Φi| = 2.
secrecy outage probability will be very high. In addition,
in case the distances between the eavesdropper and the
source and the relays are long, the received signal at the
eavesdropper will be weak due to the large path-loss, and
this results in smaller secrecy outage probability.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the secrecy performance of
different relay selection schemes in cooperative NOMA sys-
tems when a source node communicates with multiple users
via multiple energy-harvesting relay nodes in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We have derived new explicit
analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability
considering three different relay selection schemes: 1) when
the CSI of the eavesdropper is unknown, 2) when the CSI of
the eavesdropper is known, and 3) when multiple relays are
used to forward the signal to the users. The results in this
work demonstrated that no matter what the values of the
system parameters are, the optimal relay selection scheme
strictly outperforms the other two selection schemes, and
that the performance gap between the proposed schemes
depends essentially on the system setup. Furthermore, it
was shown that increasing the SNR and the number of relay
nodes can enhance the secrecy performance, while as the
users’ target data rates and the number of users increase,
the system security gets degraded.
APPENDIX A
For the derivation of Lemma 1, substituting (5) into (10),
we can express γn,k as
γn,k =
a1x
2
n yn
a2x2n yn + a3xn yn + a4xn + a5
, (53)
where xn = |hsrn |2, yn = |hrnuk |2, a1 =
βrn (1− βrn)P 2s αkηrn , a2 = βrn (1− βrn)P 2s ηrn
M∑
i=k+1
αi,
a3 = d
m
srn
βrnPsηrnσ
2
rn
, a4 = d
m
srn
dmrnuk (1− βrn)Psσ2uk , and
a5 = d
2m
srn
σ2rnd
m
rnuk
σ2uk . Therefore,
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
= 1−
Pr
(
a1x
2
n yn
a2x2n yn + a3xn yn + a4xn + a5
< ζk
)
,
(54)
where ζk = 22R¯k , and R¯k is the target rate for user k, which
can be written as
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
= 1−
Pr
(
yn
(
x2n (a1 − a2ζk)− a3xnζk
)
< ζka4xn + a5ζk
)
.
(55)
The right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq. (55) can be written as
follows:
Pr
(
yn
(
x2n (a1 − a2ζk)− a3xnζk
)
< ζka4xn + a5ζk
)
=

 Pr
(
yn >
ζka4xn+a5ζk
(x2n(a1−a2ζk)−a3xnζk)
)
= 1, xn <
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
Pr
(
yn <
ζka4xn+a5ζk
(x2n(a1−a2ζk)−a3xnζk)
)
, xn >
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
.
(56)
In this expression, if xn < a3ζka1−a2ζk , then the term
ζka4xn+a5ζk
(x2n(a1−a2ζk)−a3xnζk)
will be negative, while yn is always
positive yn > 1, so the probability in this case is 1. By
conditioning on xn, we can obtain (57), where Fyn (.) is
the CDF of yn, and fxn (.) is the PDF of xn. Since xn and
yn are both exponentially distributed, we get
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
=
∞ˆ
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
e
−
(
z+
ζka4z+a5ζk
(z2(a1−a2ζk)−a3zζk)
)
dz,
(58)
At high SNR, the last term in the denominator of the SINR
expression in (53) can be neglected, because it is included
the product of the two noise variance, i.e., a5 = 0. Thus,
the expression in (58) becomes
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
=
∞ˆ
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
e
−
(
z+
ζka4
(z(a1−a2ζk)−a3ζk)
)
dz.
(59)
Let Υ = z (a1 − a2ζk) − a3ζk, then we can approximate
(59) as
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
=
e
−
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
a1 − a2ζk
∞ˆ
0
e
−
(
Υ
a1−a2ζk
+
ζka4
Υ
)
dΥ,
(60)
which can be found as
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
) ≈ w1J1 [w1] e− a3ζka1−a2ζk , (61)
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Figure 5: Secrecy outage probability versus xde of the three schemes, when SNR=30 dB and Ro = 0.2.
Pr
(
Rn,k > R¯k
)
= 1−


a3ζk
a1−a2ζkˆ
0
fxn (z)dz+
∞ˆ
a3ζk
a1−a2ζk
Fyn
(
ζka4z + a5ζk
(z2 (a1 − a2ζk)− a3zζk)
)
fxn (z)dz

 , (57)
where w1 =
√
4ζka4
a1−a2ζk
, and J1 [.] is the first-order modified
Bessel function of the second kind [19], [30]. Similarly, we
can write γn,xk−→j as follows:
γn,xk−→j =
b1x
2
nyn
b2x2nyn + b3xnyn + b4xn + b5
, (62)
where xn = |hsrn |2, yn =
∣∣hrnuj ∣∣2, b1 =
βrn (1− βrn)P 2s αkηrn , b2 = βrn (1− βrn)P 2s ηrn
M∑
i=k+1
αi,
b3 = d
m
srn
βrnPsηrnσ
2
rn
, b4 = d
m
srn
dmrnuj (1− βrn)Psσ2uj , and
b5 = d
m
rnuj
σ2ujd
2m
srn
σ2rn . Following similar steps, we can find
Pr
(
Rn,k→j > R¯k
)
=
∞ˆ
b3ζk
b1−b2ζk
e
−
(
z+
ζkb4z+b5ζk
(z2(b1−b2ζk)−b3zζk)
)
dz.
(63)
At high SNRs, by following similar steps as in (59), (60)
and (61), (63) can be written as
Pr
(
Rn,k→j > R¯k
) ≈ w2J1 [w2] e− b3ζkb1−b2ζk , where w2 =√
4ζkb4
b1−b2ζk
. Now, to derive Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
)
, we write the
SINR at user M as
γn,M =
c1x
2
n yn
c2xn yn + c3xn + c4
, (64)
where xn = |hsrn |2, yn = |hrnuM |2, c1 =
βrn (1− βrn)P 2s αMηrn , c2 = dmsrnβrnPsηrnσ2rn ,
c3 = d
m
srn
dmrnuM (1− βrn)Psσ2uM , and c4 = dmrnujσ2ujd2msrn σ2rn .
Therefore,
Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
)
= 1−Pr
(
c1x
2
n yn
c2xn yn + c3xn + c4
< ζM
)
,
(65)
where ζM = 22R¯M and R¯M is the target rate for user M .
This probability can be written as
Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
)
= 1−
Pr
(
yn
(
x2nc1 − c2xnζM
)
< ζMc3xn + c4ζk
)
, (66)
and further expressed as
Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
)
=
∞ˆ
c2ζM
c1
e
−
(
z+
ζMc3z+c4ζM
z2c1−c2zζM
)
dz. (67)
At high SNRs, by following similar steps as in (59),
(60) and (61), Pr (Rn,M > R¯M) can be expressed by
Pr
(
Rn,M > R¯M
) ≈ w3J1 [w3] e− c2ζMc1 , where w3 =√
4ζMc3
c1
. Finally, substituting (58), (63) and (67) into (15),
we find O1.
APPENDIX B
Here, we provide the proof of Lemma 2. First, O2 in (14)
can be calculated by
O2 = Pr

1 + maxn∈Nr {γn,M}
1 + γn,e
< ζ, |Nr| > 0


= Pr
(
max
n∈Nr
{γn,M} < ζ + γn,eζ − 1, |Nr| > 0
)
. (68)
Using the law of total probability, we get (69). To find S1,
from order statistics [38] we can find (70). By conditioning
on |hsrl |2 = θ and γl,e = γ, we get (71). From (67), we
can find
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O2 =
N∑
Q=1
{
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γn,eζ − 1 | |Nr| = Q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
}
Pr (|Nr| = Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
=
N∑
Q=1
{
Q∑
l=1
Pr (n∗ = l)Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γl,eζ − 1 | |Nr| = Q, n∗ = l
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
}
Pr (|Nr| = Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
. (69)
Fmax
n∈Q
{γn,M} (ζ + γl,eζ − 1) = Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γl,eζ − 1 ||Nr| = Q, n∗ = l
)
=
Q∏
n=1
Pr (γn,M < ζ + γl,eζ − 1) . (70)
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γl,eζ − 1
∣∣∣γl,e = γ, |hsrl |2 = θ
)
=
∞´
0
∞´
0
Fmax
n∈Q
{γn,M}
(
ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) fγl,e (γ ∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) f|hsrl |2 (θ) dθdγ. (71)
Pr (γn,M < ζ + γζ − 1) = 1−
∞ˆ
c2(ζ+γζ−1)
c1
e
−
(
z+
(ζ+γζ−1)c3z+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(z2c1−c2z(ζ+γζ−1))
)
dz. (72)
At high SNRs, following similar steps as in (59),
(60) and (61), we obtain F{γn,M} (ζ + γζ − 1) ≈ 1 −
w4J1 [w4] e−
c2(ζ+γζ−1)
c1 , where w4 =
√
4(ζ+γζ−1)c3
c1
, and
Pr
(
γl,M < ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) = 1−
e
−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θ+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2c1−c2θ(ζ+γζ−1))
)
, θ >
c2 (ζ + γζ − 1)
c1
. (73)
To find the PDF of γl,e, fγl,e (γ), we can write the SINR
at the eavesdropper as
γl,e =
e1x
2
l yl
e2xlyl + e3xl + e4
, (74)
where xl = |hsrl |2, yl = |hrle|2, e1 =
βrl (1− βrl)P 2s αMηrl , e2 = dmsrlβrlPsηrlσ2rl ,
e3 = d
m
srl
dmrle (1− βrl)Psσ2e , and e4 = dmsrlσ2rl . Therefore,
the conditional CDF of γl,e is given by
Fγl,e (γ |xl = θ ) = 1− e−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
θ2e1−e2θγ
)
, θ >
e2γ
e1
. (75)
Consequently, the PDF can be found as follows:
fγl,e (γ |xl = θ ) =
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
θ2e1−e2θγ
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
.
(76)
Since |hsrl |2 is exponentially distributed, f|hsrl |2 (θ) = e
−θ
.
By conditioning on |hsrl |2 and γl,e, Eq. (71) can be
formulated as in (77), (78) and (79), where ǫ1 = e2γe1
and ǫ2 = c2(ζ+γζ−1)c1 . Using Gaussian-Quadrature rules, in
which
∞ˆ
0
e−xf (x) dx =
n∑
i=1
Hif (xi) +R (i) (80)
where xi and Hi are the ith abscissa and weight of the nth
order Laguerre polynomial tabulated in [30, eq. (25.4.45)],
respectively, and the remainder R (i) is negligible for n >
15, then the expression in (79) can be approximated as
in (81) where γi and Hi are the ith abscissa and weight
of the nth order Laguerre polynomial, respectively [30,
eq. (25.4.45)]. The probability that relay l is selected,
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Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γζ − 1
)
=
∞ˆ
0
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l
Pr (γn,M < ζ + γζ − 1)
×


∞ˆ
0
Pr
(
γl,M < ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) fγl,e (γ ∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) f|hsrl |2 (θ) dθ
}
dγ (77)
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γζ − 1
)
=
∞ˆ
0
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l
Pr (γn,M < ζ + γζ − 1)×


ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
fγl,e
(
γ
∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) f|hsrl |2 (θ) dθ
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2
Pr
(
γl,M < ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ)× fγl,e (γ ∣∣∣|hsrl |2 = θ) f|hsrl |2 (θ) dθ
}
dγ (78)
=
∞ˆ
0
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l

1−
∞ˆ
c2(ζ+γζ−1)
c1
e
−
(
z+
(ζ+γζ−1)c3z+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(z2c1−c2z(ζ+γζ−1))
)
dz

×


ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
{
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
}
e−θdθ
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2
{
1− e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θ+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2c1−c2θ(ζ+γζ−1))
)}
×
{
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
}
e−θdθ
}
dγ,
(79)
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{γn,M} < ζ + γζ − 1
)
≈
n∑
i=1
Hieγi
Q∏
n=1
n 6=l
{
1− w4J1 [w4] e−
c2(ζ+γiζ−1)
c1
}
×

e
−

 γie3 ǫ2+ǫ12 +e4γi(
( ǫ2+ǫ12 )
2
e1−e2
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
γi
)

 (
γie3
ǫ2+ǫ1
2 + e4γi
)
(ǫ2 − ǫ1) e1
(
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e−
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
γi
((
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e1 − e2 ǫ2+ǫ12 γi
)2
+
n∑
j=1
Hj

1− e−
(
(ζ+γiζ−1)c3θj+c4(ζ+γiζ−1)
(θ2j c1−c2θj(ζ+γiζ−1))
)
×

 1γi e
−
(
γie3θj+e4γi
(θ2j e1−e2θjγi)
)
(γie3θj + e4γi) θ
2
je1(
θ2j e1 − e2θjγi
)2



 , (81)
Pr (n∗ = l) = pl, can be given by
pl =
Q∏
n=1
l 6=n
Pr (γl,M > γn,M ) = Pr
(
γl,M > max
l 6=n
(γn,M )
)
=
∞ˆ
0
fγl,M (x)
Q∏
n=1
l 6=n
Fγn,M (x) dx
=
n∑
i=1
Hiexifγl,M (xi)
Q∏
n=1
l 6=n
Fγn,M (xi) , (82)
where xi and Hi are the ith abscissa and weight of the nth
order Laguerre polynomial, respectively [30, eq. (25.4.45)],
and Fγn,M (x) = 1−
∞´
c2x
c1
e
−
(
z+
x c3z+c4x
z2c1−c2zx
)
dz. At high
SNR, by following similar steps as in (59), (60) and (61),
we get Fγn,M (x) ≈
{
1−
√
4xc3
c1
J1
[√
4xc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
}
.
Also, fγl,M (x) =
∞´
c2x
c1
(c3z+c4)z
2c1
(z2c1−c2zx)
2 e
−
(
z+
x c3z+c4x
z2c1−c2zx
)
dz,
which becomes fγl,M (x) ≈(
4γMc3J0
[√
4γMc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
2xc1
+
c2xw5J1
[√
4γMc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
c1
)
at high SNR. Finally, S2 in (69) which is the probability
of having Q relays in a sub-set Nr of the EH-relays
of size |Nr|, can be obtained using the expression
Pr (|Nr| = Q) =
(
N
Q
)
P
N−Q
1 (1− P1)Q, where
P1 = Pr (|Nr| = 0).
16
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
1 + γn,M
1 + γn,e
}
< ζ
∣∣∣ |hsrn |2 = θ
)
=
Q∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
∞ˆ
0
Fγn,M
(
ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣|hsrn |2 = θ) fγn,e (γ ∣∣∣ |hsrn |2 = θ) f|hsrn |2 (θ) dθdγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
sop of user M using relay n
, (85)
APPENDIX C
In this appendix, we present the proof of Theorem 4. The
secrecy outage probability in this scheme can be calculated
as
Psop = Pr (|Nr| = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
O1
∪Pr
(
max
n∈Nr
{
Cns,M
}
< Ro, |Nr| > 0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
O3
,
(83)
where Ro is the target secrecy rate. The term O1 =
Pr (|Nr| = 0) was derived in the previous section as per
(15). Now, we derive the term O3 of (83) as
O3 =
N∑
Q=1
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
Cns,M
}
< Ro | |Nr| = Q
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆1
×Pr (|Nr| = Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆2
. (84)
Firstly, ∆2 is given by (27). Now, we can find ∆1 condi-
tionally on |hsrn |2 according to (85) where ζ = 22Ro , and
the conditional CDF of the SINR at user M , and the PDF
of the SINR at the eavesdropper, are respectively given by
Pr
(
γn,M < ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣|hsrn |2 = θ) =
1−e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θ+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2c1−c2θ(ζ+γζ−1))
)
, θ >
c2 (ζ + γζ − 1)
c1
. (86)
fγn,e
(
γ
∣∣∣|hsrn |2 = θ) =
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
. (87)
Therefore, Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
1+γn,M
1+γn,e
}
< ζ
∣∣∣|hsrn |2 = θ
)
can be
found as in (88) and (89). where ǫ1 = e2γe1 and ǫ2 =
c2(ζ+γζ−1)
c1
. The expression (89) can be approximated using
Gaussian Quadrature rules as in (90) where γi, θj and
Hi,Hi are the ith, jth abscissas and weights of the nth order
Laguerre polynomial, respectively [30, eq. (25.4.45)].
APPENDIX D
Here we provide the proof of Lemma 5. Firstly,
Pr
(
RΦn,M > R¯M
)
= 1− Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,M < γM
)
, (91)
where γM = 2aR¯M−1. As we can see from (91) the overall
SINR in this scenario is the summation of multiple random
variables. Therefore, derivation of the PDF and CDF of the
overall SINR is typically more complicated and a closed-
form expression is tedious to obtain, if not infeasible. On the
other hand, the MGF-based approach has been recognized
as an efficient and effective way for the outage analysis.
The MGF of ϕ =
ln∑
n=1
γn,M can be found as [39]
Mϕ (s) =
ln∏
n=1
Mγn,M (s) , (92)
where Mγn,M (s) is given by (93), and fγl,M (x) =
∞´
c2x
c1
(c3z+c4)z
2c1
(z2c1−c2zx)
2 e
−
(
z+
x c3z+c4x
z2c1−c2zx
)
dz. At high SNR, by
ignoring the last term in the denominator of the
γn,M expression, and following similar steps as in
(59), (60) and (61), the PDF becomes fγl,M (x) ≈(
4γMc3J0
[√
4γMc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
2xc1
+
c2xw5J1
[√
4γMc3
c1
]
e
−
c2x
c1
c1
)
.
Thus, the MGF in (93) at high SNR is
Mγn,M (s) =
∞ˆ
0
e−sγM
×
(
w25J0 [w5] e
−
c2γM
c1
2γM
+
c2γMw5J1 [w5] e−
c2γM
c1
γMc1
)
dγM ,
(94)
where w5 =
√
4γMc3
c1
. Equation (94) can be expressed in
terms of the weights and abscissas of a Laguerre polynomial
as
Mγn,M (s) =
K∑
r=1
Hr
s
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Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
1 + γn,M
1 + γn,e
}
< ζ
∣∣∣|hsrn |2 = θ
)
=
Q∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0


ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
fγn,e
(
γ
∣∣∣ |hsrn |2 = θ) f|hsrn |2 (θ) dθ
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2
Fγn,M
(
ζ + γζ − 1
∣∣∣ |hsrn |2 = θ)
× fγn,e
(
γ
∣∣∣ |hsrn |2 = θ) f|hsrn |2 (θ) dθ} dγ, (88)
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
1 + γn,M
1 + γn,e
}
< ζ
∣∣∣|hsrn |2 = θ
)
=
Q∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0


ǫ2ˆ
ǫ1
(
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
γ (θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
)
e−θdθ
+
∞ˆ
ǫ2
(
1− e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θ+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2c1−c2θ(ζ+γζ−1))
))
×
(
1
γ
e
−
(
γe3θ+e4γ
(θ2e1−e2θγ)
)
(γe3θ + e4γ) θ
2e1
(θ2e1 − e2θγ)2
)
e−θdθ
}
dγ, (89)
Pr
(
max
n∈Q
{
1 + γn,M
1 + γn,e
}
< ζ
∣∣∣ |hsrn |2 = θ
)
≈
Q∏
n=1
n∑
i=1
Hieγi



e−

 γie3 ǫ2+ǫ12 +e4γi(
( ǫ2+ǫ12 )
2
e1−e2
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
γi
)

 (
γie3
ǫ2+ǫ1
2 + e4γi
)
(ǫ2 − ǫ1)
(
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e1
γi
((
ǫ2+ǫ1
2
)2
e1 − e2 ǫ2+ǫ12 γi
)2


+
n∑
j=1
Hj

1− e−
(
(ζ+γζ−1)c3θj+c4(ζ+γζ−1)
(θ2j c1−c2θj(ζ+γζ−1))
)
×

 1γi e
−
(
γie3θj+e4γi
(θ2j e1−e2θjγi)
)
(γie3θj + e4γi) θ
2
j e1(
θ2j e1 − e2θjγi
)2



 . (90)
Mγn,M (s) =
∞ˆ
0
e−sγn,M fγn,M (γM ) dγM ,
=
∞ˆ
0
e−sγM
γM


∞ˆ
c2γM
c1
e
−xn−
γMc3xn+c4γM
(x2nc1−c2xnγM )
(γMc3xn + c4γM )x
2c1
(x2nc1 − c2xnγM )2
dx

 dγM . (93)
×

sw25r J0 [w5r ] e− c2γMrsc1
2γMr
+
sc2γMrw5r J1 [w5r ] e
−
c2γMr
sc1
γMrc1

 ,
(95)
where Hr and γMr are the rth abscissa and weight, re-
spectively, of the Kth order Laguerre polynomial, and
w5r =
√
4γMr c3
c1
. Subsequently, the exact probability
Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,M < γM
)
can be obtained with the inverse
Laplace transform as
Pr
(
ln∑
n=1
γn,M < γM
)
= L−1
(Mϕ (s)
s
)
=
1
2πj
̺+j∞ˆ
̺−j∞
Mϕ (s)
s
esγMds, (96)
where L−1 denotes the inverse Laplace transform, and ̺
is chosen in the region of convergence of the integral in
the complex s plane. The integral in (96) can be evaluated
numerically efficiently using the available mathematical
softwares or by applying numerical techniques. Several
methods for evaluating the inverse Laplace transform have
been introduced in the literature. A valuable summary of
these methods is provided in [33], [34]. Using (11) in [34],
the CDF of the summation of SINRs can be mapped directly
from the MGF using (97).
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Pr
(
l∑
n=1
γn,M < γM
)
=
2−Qe
A
2
γM
Q∑
q=0
(
Q
q
) N+q∑
n=0
(−1)n
βn
R


Mϕ
(
A+ 2πjn
2γM
)
A+ 2πjn
2γM

+ E(A,N,Q). (97)
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